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Abstract There is an abundance of semi-structured
reports on events being written and made available on
the World Wide Web on a daily basis. These reports
are primarily meant for human use. A recent move-
ment is the addition of RDF metadata to make auto-
matic processing by computers easier. A ne example
of this movement is the Open Government Data initia-
tive which, by representing data from spreadsheets and
textual reports in RDF, strives to speed up the creation
of geographical mashups and visual analytics applica-
tions. In this paper we present a new linked data set
and the method we use to automatically translate semi-
structured reports on the Web to an RDF event model.
We demonstrate how the semantic representation layer
makes it possible to easily analyze and visualize the ag-
gregated reports to answer domain questions through
a SPARQL client for the R statistical programming
language. We showcase our method on piracy attack
reports issued by the International Chamber of Com-
merce (ICC-CCS). Our pipeline includes conversion of
the reports to RDF, linking their parts to external re-
sources from the Linked Open Data cloud and exposing
them to the Web.
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1 Introduction
Governmental and commercial organisations collect a
wealth of information; from census to trade data and
from pollution to crime. Too often, making sense of
these data is a time consuming undertaking as most
data is stored in many spreadsheets or textual reports.
Recent initiatives, such as the Open Government Data
initiative1 have shown the added benet of using Se-
mantic Web technologies to unlock the potential of such
data.
In this article, we rst present a new data set on
the Web of Data, Linked Open Piracy (LOP) describ-
ing maritime piracy events and detail its construction.
Then we present an approach and tool for analyzing
this type of data and show how these can be used to an-
swer complex questions about the domain. We expose
descriptions of piracy attacks at sea published to the
Web by the International Chamber of Commerce's In-
ternational Maritime Bureau (ICC-CCS IMB) and the
US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)2 as
Linked Data RDF3.
LOP can be seen as an Open Government Data ini-
tiative for intergovernmental data. The goal of Open
Government Data is to reduce the time to do analytics
and mashups with open government data. The piracy
reports are, similar to most open government data that
is for example processed into data.gov, published in
a human readable format4. We show how, by convert-
ing the IMB piracy reports to RDF and linking them
1 Open Government Data,
http://data-gov.tw.rpi.edu/wiki/The_Data-gov_Wiki
2 NGA, http://www.nga.mil/portal/site/maritime/
3 LOP, http://semanticweb.cs.vu.nl/poseidon/ns/
4 A notable exception is data.gov.uk where the data are
exposed directly as machine friendly RDF.2 Willem Robert van Hage et al.
to LOD cloud resources, we reduce the commonly ac-
knowledged bottleneck of data preprocessing time in
the workow from question to answer.
The format and type of publication of the IMB pira-
cy reports (following a given pattern for year of publica-
tion, daily updated to the web page) makes it an ideal
test case for automatic RDF event extraction; the topic
of the reports is also of contemporary socio-economic
concern [3] and is related to research questions that go
beyond what classic data mining can easily answer. We
therefore chose to take this example as a showcase for
the feasibility and usability of event extraction coupled
with novel research question answering methods.
As the main structure for our representation of LOP
in RDF, we chose the Simple Event Model (SEM) [24]
and demonstrate that an event model is not only an
intuitive way of representing (inter)governmental data,
but also a powerful tool for data integration. We use
SWI-Prolog5 to extract event descriptions from the web,
represent them in SEM and store them in a ClioPa-
tria RDF repository [27]. The SWI-Prolog space pack-
age [25] is used for spatial and temporal indexing. The
added benet of using SEM as a model for Open Gov-
ernment Data is evaluated by answering complex do-
main questions derived from authorities in the domain
of piracy analysis, UNITAR UNOSAT and the ICC-
CCS IMB. To perform the analysis and evaluation, we
utilize the SPARQL package6 for R7, which bridges the
gap between RDF and statistical data processing.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.
In Section 2, we describe the IMB and NGA reports
on the Web. In Section 3, we show the event extraction
method we used to create RDF event descriptions from
web pages. In Section 4, we discuss the modelling of the
events in SEM. In Section 5, we extend the event models
with extra properties about weapon use extracted au-
tomatically from the textual narratives included in the
event reports. In Section 6, we show how the LOD data
set can be accessed online. In Section 7, we show how
we process the event descriptions in the R statistical
programming language and we evaluate which domain
questions from the IMB and UNOSAT can be answered
using our event representation in SEM and which ad-
ditional results we achieved as corollaries. In Section 8,
we discuss related projects, methods, and event mod-
els. In Section 9, we conclude with a discussion of our
ndings and a summary of our future work.
5 SWI-Prolog, http://www.swi-prolog.org/
6 SPARQL R, http://cran.r-project.org/package=SPARQL
7 R, http://r-project.org/
Fig. 1 Example of an IMB piracy report
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
276 237 260 293 395 458 434
Table 1 Number of reports from 2005 to 2011.
2 Maritime Piracy Reports on the Web
In 2008, the increase of piracy attacks in the Gulf of
Aden made the publication and analysis of events hap-
pening at sea around the world a new priority. The ICC-
CCS gathers the reports related to piracy broadcasted
by ships around the world, and publishes them daily
on their website8. The reports are semi-structured, and
concern seven (predened) types of events: Hijacked,
Boarded, Robbed, Attempted, Fired Upon, Suspicious
(vessel spotted) and Kidnapped. An example report is
shown in Figure 1. The reports contains a eld for the
vessel type of the ship broadcasting the report; although
the types of the vessels are often recurring, this eld is
lled manually, which gives rise to spelling variations
(e.g., tanker vs tankership) and a lack of certainty in
terms of coverage: a new ship type could be lled in
any day. The description of the event itself is written
up full text, without a specic formatting except that
it is often preceded, in the same eld, by the geographic
and temporal coordinates of the event described. The
geographic and temporal coordinates are repeated in an
independent eld each.
The number of reported incident has risen steadily
since the ICC-CCS started collecting incident reports
in 2005. The number of reports for each year is shown
in Table 1.
3 Collecting Piracy Reports
In this section, we rst detail how the piracy reports
were collected from the ICC-CCS IMB Website, fol-
8 IMB, http://www.icc-ccs.org/home/imbLinked Open Piracy: A story about e-Science, Linked Data, and statistics 3
lowed by an example of how this approach can eas-
ily be adopted to collect piracy reports from another
source. A copy of the code discussed in this section can
be found online at http://www.few.vu.nl/~wrvhage/
LOP/LOP_code_JoDS.zip.
3.1 ICC-CCS IMB Website
We start crawling of the ICC-CCS IMB web page with
the links to the yearly archives in the menu of the Live
Piracy Map page. For each of these pages we follow all
the links in the descriptions of the place marks on the
overview map. These are injected into the DOM tree
with Javascript at runtime. We fetch them from the
Javascript by parsing the Javascript with Prolog gram-
mar rules. This gives us a collection of semi-structured
description pages, one for each event.
We fetch the various elds from these pages using
XPath queries and Prolog rules for value conversion and
xing irregularities. In this way we fetch: (1) The IMB's
report number, which consists of the year and a counter.
From this we generate an event identier by prepending
a namespace and by appending a sux whenever there
are duplicate attack numbers in a year; (2) The date of
the attack, which we convert to ISO 8601 format; (3)
The vessel type, which we map to URIs with rules that
normalize a few spelling variations of the types. (4) The
location detail, which we use as a label for the place of
the event; (5) The attack type, which we map to URIs
in the same way as the vessel type; (6) The incident
details, which we convert to a comment describing the
event itself. The rst line is split into a time and place
indication. These are used as backup sources to derive
the date and location, should the parsing of elds nr. 2,
4 and 7 fail; (7) The longitude and latitude of the place
mark on the map insert. These are used as coordinates
of a generated anonymous place (i.e., without a URI)
for the event.
Over the years the layout of the IMB reports has
changed, so to get the same eld we use a number of
dierent XPath expressions. For example, to get the
narrative eld we can use:
//div[contains(@id,"narrations")]/p/text().
The time fetched from the date (3) or narrative (6) eld
has a number of dierent representations in the source
pages. Some time indications are in local time, while
others are in UTC. Often there is no indication of the
time zone. We have seen examples where the indicated
time without time zone has to be local time and cases
where it has to be UTC. For many events the indicated
time is 00:00 (midnight) to denote the time of attack
is unknown. These inconsistencies in the time notation,
in combination with the fact that there are few events
on the same day, led us to the decision to use the date
without a time indication whenever there is ambiguity
about the time.
3.2 NGA WTS Reports
To demonstrate that the representation of extracted
events in SEM aids the integration of data sources we
take another set of piracy reports and try to integrate
these with the IMB reports.
Our example set comes from the Worldwide Threat
to Shipping reports by the US National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA)9. Two example reports are
shown in Figure 2. We take a set of reports describ-
ing 36 piracy events between the 26th of march 2010
to the 16th of april 2010. 31 of these events overlap
with the IMB reports. The remaining 5 come from other
sources: Reuters (2)10, UK Maritime Trade Operations
(UKMTO)11, The Maritime Security Center { Horn of
Africa (MSCHOA)12, and The Regional Cooperation
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)13.
These reports are (re)posted on many websites, so-
me of which are plain-text representations of the re-
ports, while others add some additional layout tags to
separate the place, time, and state of the ship during
the attack from the narrative. By changing the XPath
and grammar rules to suit the dierent structure of the
WTS reports we were able to recognize the same 7 at-
tributes we got from the IMB website. The event termi-
nology is nearly the same as on the IMB website, except
there is a distinction between boardings and robberies.
There is also some extra information in 34 of the 36 re-
ports about the state of the ship during the attack,
whether it was moored or underway. Sometimes the
NGA reports also mention the name of the ship. For
some of the events, there are no explicit coordinates of
the location of the event, but there is a textual descrip-
tion, for example, \approximately 150NM northwest of
Port Victoria, Seychelles". For these events, we look
up the coordinates of Port Victoria using the GeoN-
ames search web service14. From this location we per-
form trigonometry along the geoid with the haversine
9 NGA http://www.nga.mil/portal/site/maritime
10 Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/
11 UKMTO,
http://www.mschoa.org/Links/Pages/UKMTO.aspx
12 The Maritime Security Center { Horn of Africa,
http://www.mschoa.org/
13 The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia,
http://www.recaap.org/
14 GeoNames search, http://sws.geonames.org/search4 Willem Robert van Hage et al.
Fig. 2 Example of two NGA piracy reports.
formula in the specied direction. For example, in the
case of 150NM northwest we compute the coordinates
150 minutes of angle at a bearing of 315 degrees. The
same problems with time indications apply to the NGA
set as to the IMB set so we treated time in the same
way, reducing it to an ISO 8601 date.
We match the NGA reports to the reports extracted
from the IMB site by picking the nearest event that oc-
curred on the same day that has compatible actor types.
By compatible we mean exact equivalence of types or
asem:subTypeOf relation. This way, we were able to au-
tomatically map 30 of the 31 overlapping reports cor-
rectly. We store these matches with an owl:sameAs prop-
erty between the two matching events. We believe the
single unmatched report was mistakingly identied as
a distinct IMB report, because it is extremely similar
to another report (the same date, place, time, victim
vessel type, and similar narrative) which has a match-
ing IMB report. Therefore, we believe there should only
have been 30 overlapping reports, which we were all able
to match.
4 Event Representation
We use the set of 7 report elements (numbered 1 to
7 in Section 3) extracted per report to generate a se-
mantic event description using the Simple Event Model
(SEM) [24]. A graphical example of a SEM event de-
scription is given in Figure 3. We rst generate a URI
for the event described in the report and a URI for the
victim ship that is based on the IMB attack number (nr.
1). The victim ship is represented as a sem:Actor. The
date (nr. 2) is attached to the sem:Event by means of the
sem:hasTimeStamp property. The sem:hasTimeStamp
datatype property is chosen over the sem:hasTime ob-
ject property because we do not need type hierarchies
over time instances to answer our domain questions.
The vessel type (nr. 3) is typed as a sem:ActorType at-
tached to the victim ship sem:Actor with the sem:actor-
Type property, a subproperty of rdf:type. The location
detail (nr. 4) is made an rdfs:label of the blank node
representing the location of the attack. In our represen-
tation we chose to represent the exact location of the
attack and to not use the Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZs)15 (usually dened as 200 nautical miles from
the coast of the nearest state), or the GeoNames iden-
tier of the nearest relevant place, to represent the lo-
cation of the attack. The reason is that this would have
removed the distinction between the exact location of
the attack and the more general region, resulting in
the assignment of the same place to 18 events when
using EEZs or over 600 events when using GeoNames
identiers. For certain types of analyses it is handy to
have EEZs or GeoNames identiers for the events, but
we chose to arrange this through mappings (see Sec-
tion 4.1). The attack type (nr. 5) is modeled analo-
gously to the vessel type as a sem:EventType, that is
attached to the event using the sem:eventType property.
The event type robbery that we found in the NGA
set was modelled as a sem:subTypeOf the IMB event
type boarding. The mooring and underway vessel states
are modelled as additional event types of the piracy
event using extra sem:eventType properties attached to
the event. All event types in this data set are sem:sub-
TypeOf the piracy event type, poseidon:etype piracy.
sem:subTypeOf is a subproperty of rdfs:subClassOf,
which enables us to use RDFS to select any set of
attacks we are interested in. The narrative of the re-
port (nr. 6) is attached to the event as a rdfs:comment.
The WGS84 coordinates (nr. 7) are assigned to the
blank node with the W3C WGS84 vocabulary. Addi-
tional ship names are attached to the sem:Actor using
the ais:name property, a domain-specic label for ship
names.
4.1 Mappings
We create local URIs to represent the types of the ex-
tracted events and the types of their participants (e.g.,
poseidon:etype hijacked or poseidon:atype lpg tanker)16.
The SEM piracy events are aligned with the follow-
ing vocabularies in the Linked Open Data cloud: Word-
15 http://www.vliz.be/vmcdata/marbound/
16 The shorthand for the name space of the local URIs is
poseidon because the LOP data set was created during the
Poseidon project (http://www.esi.nl/poseidon/).Linked Open Piracy: A story about e-Science, Linked Data, and statistics 5
skos:
closeMatch
poseidon:event
_2010_326
sem:hasActor
sem:hasPlace
poseidon:etype
_hijacked
sem:eventType
poseidon:atype
_lpg_tanker
sem:actorType
sem:Event sem:Actor sem:Place
poseidon:ship
_victim_event
_2010_326
sem:EventType sem:ActorType
2010-10-23
sem:hasTimeStamp
-4.23333
wgs84:lat
41.31667
wgs84:long
Around 98nm east of 
Mombasa, Kenya
rdfs:label
23.10.2010: 1235 UTC: 
Posn 04:14.0S – 041:19.0E
Around 98 nm east of Mombasa, 
Kenya, Off Southern Somalia.
Armed pirates attacked and 
hijacked a LPG tanker underway. 
Further details awaited.
rdfs:comment
eez:Kenya
eez:inEEZ
eez:inPiracyRegion
eez:Region
_East_Africa
geonames:
192950
geonames:inCountry
poseidon:etype
_piracy
wn30:synset-
hijacking-
noun-1
rdf:type rdf:type
rdf:type rdf:type
sem:subTypeOf
Fig. 3 The complete RDF graph of a piracy report modeled in SEM including mappings to types in WordNet 3.0, a VLIZ
exclusive economic zone, its corresponding GeoNames country, and its Piracy Region (see Section 4.1).
Net 2.017, 3.018, OpenCyc19 and Freebase20. Even with
the ICC-CCS's semi-structured format, there is still
some variation in the values, because the elds are lled
in manually (e.g., the term hijacking can be spelled
highjacking or hijacking). WordNet can help us here to
relate dierent lexical variations to a unique URI. We
use this to automatically transform piracy descriptions
to types. WordNet also has a hierarchy of hyponym
relations between synsets (e.g., a tankership is a hy-
ponym of cargoship), which enables us to do hyponym
inference.
We can not map all of our types to any one of
these three vocabularies, but by mapping to all three of
them we obtain a good coverage of our domain-specic
type vocabulary. As our data set only contains 73 Ac-
torTypes and 26 EventTypes, it is not worthwhile to
set up an automatic mapping method, so we manu-
ally created the following mappings: 70 skos:closeMatch
(24 to Freebase, 24 to OpenCyc, 25 to WordNet)21; 10
skos:broadMatch (5 to OpenCyc, 4 to WordNet, 1 to
Freebase); 33 skos:relatedMatch (13 to OpenCyc, 11 to
WordNet, 9 to Freebase). A \related" relation holds
for example between WordNet's to re and the event
type red upon, because to re only conveys part of the
meaning.
As mentioned earlier in this section, it may be use-
ful to classify each event by its place. For this, we need
a classication of space. We chose to use the ocial
17 WordNet 2.0, http://www.w3.org/2006/03/wn/wn20/
18 WordNet 3.0, http://semanticweb.cs.vu.nl/lod/wn30/
19 OpenCyc, http://sw.opencyc.org/
20 Freebase, http://{www|rdf}.freebase.com/
21 We use closeMatch to represent the slight mismatch be-
tween the denitions of the concepts in SEM and the 3 target
vocabularies.
geopolitical borders of the world, dened by the ex-
clusive economic zones (EEZs). We classied all event
places according to whether they are in or nearest
to an EEZ. We take the specication of the borders
of these zones from the World EEZ version 5 data set
from the VLIZ Maritime Boundaries Geodatabase22.
This data set contains all EEZs of the world in KML
format. We use the SWI-Prolog space package [25] to
extract the shapes and their descriptions from the KML
le and to perform containment and nearest-neighbor
queries for all sem:Places of the events and all the EEZs.
The remaining surface of the earth, including the in-
ternational waters and inland seas is partitioned based
on the nearest EEZ (using Prolog space nearest/3
queries on the EEZ shapes). The area nearest to an
EEZ is assigned a new URI. For instance, The area
of the international waters o the coast of Liberia and
closest to Liberia's EEZ (i.e., not closest to Ascension's,
C^ ote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone's, or Saint Helena's EEZs)
is assigned the URI eez:Nearest to Liberia.
For the piracy domain, we make an additional, more
general, partitioning of the world into regions. This
partitioning is based on the distribution of the piracy
events (e.g., Gulf of Aden, Carribean) and follows the
EEZs (using Prolog space intersects/3 queries on
the EEZ shapes). This grouping is domain specic and
specic to the task of showing developments in piracy
events.
5 Narrative Analysis
Although the SEM piracy event descriptions already
provide a rich source for report analysis, there is still a
22 VLIZ, http://www.vliz.be/vmdcdata/marbound/6 Willem Robert van Hage et al.
treasure of information contained in the unstructured
event narratives. These snippets of text that are in-
cluded in the piracy reports from 2007 on contain for
example information about the weapons that were used,
the number of attackers, possible outcomes of the at-
tack and whether the victim received any assistance.
There is a great variety in the length and types of in-
formation that is given in the narratives, as can be seen
from Examples below:
poseidon:event 2010 008:
\tank stripping operations. Robbers escaped with
ships stores. Pilot and port control informed."
poseidon:event 2011 140:
\22.03.2011: 2200 LT: Posn: 02:45.22N 104:24.29E,
O Tioman island, Malaysia.A group of more than
10 pirates armed with long knives in a speed boat
boarded a tug towing a barge enroute from Singa-
pore to Koh Kong, Cambodia. They took hostage
the 10 crewmembers, locked them in a cabin, cut of
the tracking system on the tug and hijacked the ves-
sel. On 24.03.2011, they released the crew in a life
raft and gave them some food, water, their pass-
ports and some money. By then, the tug boat had
been repainted to a green colour. On 26.03.2011,
a passing-by shing boat rescued the crewmembers
and landed them at Natuna Island and the crew
managed to contact the owners. All relevant au-
thorities in the region informed to lookout for the
hijacked tug and barge."
The narrative sections contain a large variety of in-
formation types such as weapon types, actions of the
victims, actions of the attackers, number of attackers
and what type of vessel the attackers used, most of
them expressed in running text. This makes a eld seg-
menting task much harder than for example the task
of segmenting addresses [2]. Closest to our data set is
a eld segmentation task carried out for collection re-
ports for specimens in the natural history domain [5,
13,22]. However, those reports contain fewer free text
information types (only 2 versus 9 for the pirates), as
well as many shorter elds that are easier to recognise.
As deep linguistic analysis of the narratives is out of
the scope of this contribution, we only detail the infor-
mation extraction experiments we carried out in order
to retrieve the weapon type used by the attackers.
5.1 Data Preparation
Following the distribution of the events from 2007 to
2011, we annotated 200 event instance narratives with
weapon information. Due to the increase in the number
of attacks the breakdown of the events is as follows:
14% from 2007, 16% from 2008, 22% from 2009, 24%
from 2010 and 24% from 2011. We chose to take time
into account, as we saw from the event types that the
nature of the attacks has changed, which we suspect
may also inuence the weapon type. Within the years,
the events were chosen randomly.
In the selected events, the following weapon classes
are encountered: knives, guns, automatic weapons, kni-
ves and guns, catapults, knives and hacksaws, automatic
weapons and RPGs, rockets and guns. Furthermore, we
also encounter instances where no weapon type is men-
tioned armed, or no weapons are mentioned at allno
mention.
As the weapon types are often expressed using sim-
ilar words, we chose to use a vector space approach
using a modied bag of words to represent the com-
ment sections. Our modied bag of words consists of a
combination of noun phrases (unigrams, bigrams and
the occasional trigram) as well as adjectives. The data
is rst tokenised using a simple symbol driven tokenizer
implemented in Perl, after which the noun phrases are
selected.The noun phrases that are found are for exam-
ple armed pirates and armed security team. This helps
to discern between weapons used by attackers and by
the victims better than single word features. The nal
data preparation step consists of stemming using the
Porter Stemming Algorithm [17].
5.2 Results
We used WEKA version 3.6.2 [9] to perform our initial
feature selection, bringing down the number of features
from 1,142 (4 features derived from the structured data
namely year, type of attack, eez, and ship type, 1,026
noun phrase features, and 12 adjective features) to 48
(4 structured features, 60 noun phrase features, and 4
adjective features). We then use the WEKA implemen-
tation of the RIPPER algorithm [6] to construct an ini-
tial set of rules to classify the weapon type. This set of
rules gives us an F-measure of 76.8% on the 200 anno-
tated examples in a 10 fold cross-validation experiment.
In Table 2, the results per weapon class are presented.
Even though the classication is not perfect, the
results are actually more useful than the precision, re-
call and F-measure would indicate. This is because the
classes form a hierarchical structure where in some cases
it is not so bad if the classier makes a mistake, for ex-
ample when the classier mistakes a rearm for a gun.
We chose not to merge the rearms and gun classes, as
guns are only a subset of rearms, but in many cases
they will be guns. We see similar examples with steelLinked Open Piracy: A story about e-Science, Linked Data, and statistics 7
Class # Precision Recall F1
Knives 29 0.893 0.862 0.877
Steel Rod 1 0 0 0
Catapults, knives and hacksaws 1 0 0 0
Guns 11 0.6 0.818 0.692
Guns and Knives 5 0.6 0.6 0.6
Firearms 23 0.818 0.783 0.8
RPGs 1 0 0 0
Automatic Weapons 11 0.778 0.636 0.7
Automatic Weapons + RPGs 13 0.733 0.846 0.786
Guns and RPGs 5 0 0 0
Unspecied 22 0.632 0.545 0.585
No mention of weapons 78 0.845 0.91 0.877
Overall 200 0.761 0.78 0.768
Table 2 Results of weapon classication using RIPPER on 68 features
rod (of which there is only one example in our train-
ing set, and our classier will classify that instance as
`armed'). As the RIPPER algorithm does not assign
multiple classes to an instance, it also has proportion-
ally more trouble with the `mixed' weapons instances
than with the single weapon instances. It for example
classies 2 instances of class knives and guns as just
knives, and does this also for the instance of class cat-
apults, knives and hacksaws.
In the LOP data, the weapon type used in the attack
is represented by a separate lop:attackerWeapon prop-
erty that is attached to the event. The representations
of the weapon type for events 2010 326 and 2011 261
are for example given as:
poseidon:event 2010 326 lop:attackerWeapon
poseidon:wtype armed .
poseidon:event 2011 261 lop:attackerWeapon
poseidon:wtype gun, poseidon:wtype knife .
In future work, we will look at deeper natural lan-
guage processing techniques to also detect other infor-
mation types from the narratives, as well to improve on
the current weapons classication results.
5.3 Weapons Analysis
Although the weapons classication is not perfect, it
can already give an indication of dierent weapon use in
dierent regions. For this analysis, we have aggregated
all non-re arms (knives, steel rods, catapults and hack-
saws) into `Melee Weapons', all light rearms (guns and
rearms) into `Firearms' and all heavy rearms (auto-
matic weapons, RPGs) into `Automatic Firearms'. We
have plotted the results for four piracy hotspots, namely
the Gulf of Aden, East Africa, the India Bengal zone
and Indonesia and show the results in Figure 4. These
charts show that in the attacks in the Gulf of Aden
and East Africa rearms are much more popular than
melee weapons, whereas the opposite is true for Indone-
sia. In the India Bengal zone, the weapons distribution
is fairly equal. This type of information can be useful to
estimate what type of counter-piracy measures to apply
in what region.
6 Hosting the Piracy Data
The entire ICC-CCS data set, as described in the pre-
vious sections, is hosted as Linked Data on a ClioPatria
server. All URIs in the data set are resolvable. For ex-
ample the event with the URI poseidon:event 2010 326
(shown in Figure 3) is found at: http://semanticweb.
cs.vu.nl/poseidon/ns/instances/event_2010_326.
The SPARQL endpoint is available at:
http://semanticweb.cs.vu.nl/lop/query. A KML
rendering of the data set can be found at http://www.
few.vu.nl/~wrvhage/LOP/LOP.kmz. All event descrip-
tions in the KML version have links to the original ICC-
CCS webpages and the RDF version of the event.
7 Statistical Analysis
In this section, we show how the event representation
makes it easy to answer domain questions through vi-
sualizations and analyses. We rst demonstrate how we
access the data from R, a language and environment for
statistical computing and graphics7, using the SPARQL
package for R6. Then we show how we apply these tech-
niques to recreate UNOSAT and IMB reports (subsec-
tions 7.2 and 7.3). Then we show the added value of
the mappings and hierarchies in an additional set of
domain questions (subsection 7.4).8 Willem Robert van Hage et al.
Melee Weapons 1.24%
Firearms 39.83%
Automatic Firearms 58.92%
Gulf of Aden
Melee Weapons 9.05%
Firearms 29.65%
Automatic Firearms 61.31%
East Africa
Melee Weapons 41.3%
Firearms 38.41% Automatic Firearms 20.29%
India Bengal
Melee Weapons 83.57%
Firearms 15.49%
Automatic Firearms 0.94%
Indonesia
Fig. 4 Breakdown of aggregated weapon types for Gulf of Aden, East Africa, India Bengal and Indonesia. The Gulf of Aden
is a war zone compared to Indonesia.
7.1 The R SPARQL package
The R language allows us to easily select, aggregate and
visualize the event descriptions, and to perform statisti-
cal tests. These are exactly the tools that are needed to
answer commonly asked questions about piracy events,
such as \Has the intensity of attacks really increased
in the Gulf of Aden in the past years?" or \Is there a
dierence in the types of attacks that occur in the Gulf
of Aden and in the rest of the world?".
To make it possible to use R to process the Linked
Open Piracy event descriptions we use the SPARQL
package for R developed together with Tomi Kaup-
pinen. This package allows us to access SPARQL end
points and pose SELECT or UPDATE queries. In this
case we use SELECT queries to gather tables that de-
scribe the various properties of the events. For example,
if we want to show the attack intensity in the Gulf of
Aden over time we will need the time and the region
of the LOP events. Figure 5 shows the R code that
accomplishes this. We rst dene where the SPARQL
end point can be found by declaring the URL of the end
point, http://semanticweb.cs.vu.nl/lop/sparql/.
Then we specify the RDF graph pattern that connects
an event's time and region in a SELECT query and
we re that query at the end point. To shorten the
URIs that we get back we can declare abbreviations
for namespaces. The result of the SPARQL call is a
data frame with a column for each variable in the SE-
LECT query and a row for each instantiation of these
variables. To count the events in the Gulf of Aden we
make a slice of the data frame that we retrieve from the
SPARQL end point. This slice selects the rows of the
data frame that have eez:Region Gulf of Aden as a value
in the region column. Then we determine the quarter of
the year the event happened in by converting the time
column to quarters, and aggregate the list of events to
a table of counts. This table can be used for statistical
analysis or visualization. A visualization of the counts
is shown in Figure 7.Linked Open Piracy: A story about e-Science, Linked Data, and statistics 9
library(SPARQL)
library(zoo) # provides as.yearqtr
endpoint <- 'http://semanticweb.cs.vu.nl/lop/sparql/'
# find timestamps and regions of piracy events
query <-
'SELECT ?region ?time
WHERE { ?event sem:hasTimeStamp ?time .
?event sem:hasPlace ?place .
?place eez:inPiracyRegion ?region . }'
# define eez namespace to shorten URIs to QNames
ns <- c('eez',
'http://semanticweb.cs.vu.nl/poseidon/ns/eez/')
# fire query at SPARQL end point
data <- SPARQL(url=endpoint,query=query,ns=ns)$results
# select the region Gulf of Aden
slice <- data[ data[['region']] ==
'eez:Region_Gulf_of_Aden', ]
# count the events per quarter
counts <- table(as.yearqtr(as.Date(slice[['time']])))
# plot the results
plot(counts,type='b')
Fig. 5 R code that uses the SPARQL package to access the
Linked Open Piracy data set. This code produces the plot
shown in Figure 7.
In the rest of this section, we will apply this method
of using SPARQL projections of RDF graphs into R ta-
bles for visual and statistical analysis to answer ques-
tions from piracy reports of the United Nations Insti-
tute for Training and Research (UNITAR) Operational
Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT). Prior to
the conversion of the IMB reports to Linked Open Data
the statistics in these reports were time-consumingly
compiled manually. Having the data in a structured and
queryable format can make this considerably simpler
and more ecient, so the human researcher can spend
more time on interpreting the results of the analyses.
The code used to generate the plots shown in the rest
of this article can be found online23.
7.2 Rebuilding UNOSAT Reports
The analysis performed and compiled for the UNOSAT
reports [21] are usually mostly carried out manually and
sometimes with the aid of a GIS. The analyses are thor-
ough and insightful, but do require painstaking manual
sifting through the data because only the unprocessed
attack reports are used. Human researchers then plot
these data on maps, and assign attack types to them.
23 LOP R, http://www.few.vu.nl/~wrvhage/LOP/PlotLOP.R
With the RDF version and the mappings to the VLIZ
economic zones and geospatial reasoning the analyses
that require a combination of data sources can be sped
up immensely. SPARQL can make many complex ques-
tions as simple as a graph query. Having an RDF event
model to work with makes selecting, extending, and
correlating the data much easier than just having GIS
map layers.
The conclusion of Section 2 in the UNOSAT 2009
report, namely that the attacks have shifted southward
and extended further east-west along the axis of the In-
ternational Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC)24
can be reproduced by combining geographical infor-
mation about the attacks with information about the
(IRTC). This is illustrated in Figure 6. A time ani-
mation in KML is available online25. Although more
coastguard and marine vessels are present in the rec-
ommended corridor, pirates also know that there are
more ships there, hence more chances of nding a vic-
tim. For a discussion about how to visualise and count
the actual numbers of attacks in the vicinity of the pa-
trolled corridors using the SWI-Prolog space package
see [24].
Tables and graphs summarizing the number of suc-
cessful hijackings, arrests and attacks, such as those on
page 3 (summarizing the total number of reported at-
tacks per region) and 5 (type of attacks per quarter)
of the report, are simply pulled out of the data using
a few queries and then some adding up in one's fa-
vorite statistics program such as R.7 For example, the
hijackings can be found by querying for sem:eventType
poseidon:etype hijacked and the attempts that failed by
querying for poseidon:etype attempted instead. In Fig-
ure 11 an overview of the counts of every event type
is shown for the four most notorious piracy regions of
the world, the Gulf of Aden, East Africa, India and the
Bay of Bengal, and Indonesia. Comparing the red to
the pink bars gives an indication of the success rate of
pirates in these regions.
7.3 Visualizing IMB highlights
The IMB piracy reporting centre regularly posts trends
they detect in the piracy data on their website. In this
section, we take a report from the IMB website and
show how the information discussed in the report can
be extracted from the processed piracy data.
On Wednesday 21 October 2009 the IMB reports
that there is an unprecedented increase in Somali pi-
24 http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/
163-coalition-warships-set-up-maritime-security-patrol-
-area-in-the-gulf-of-aden
25 LOP KML, http://www.few.vu.nl/~wrvhage/LOP/LOP.kmz10 Willem Robert van Hage et al.
Fig. 6 Attacks plotted in Google Earth, along with shapes indicating the areas of the International Recommended Transit
Corridor (IRTC) shown in red. The attacks follow the patrolled corridors. Pirates go where there are ships to attack. An
animated version of this gure can be found online25.
rate activity26. If we plot the number of attacks in the
Gulf of Aden region (see Figure 7) we see that the signif-
icant jump in the number of attacks already appeared
in the third quarter of 2008 (signicance computed us-
ing Welch's Two Sample t-test, p=0.05). We also see
that after 2009, the number of attacks decreases in the
Gulf of Aden (from Figure 8 we can see that is shifts to
the region around India). In section 7.1 we will go into
detail how to automatically produce the counts shown
in Figure 7.
7.4 Additional Questions
We start with an easy visualization of number of attacks
per region per year (Figure 8). From this gure, we can
see that the most active regions are the Gulf of Aden,
Indonesia, the India Bengal zone and East Africa. The
Figure also shows that Indonesia used to be the most
active region, but sometime in 2007 activity in the Gulf
of Aden and East Africa have become the regions with
most piracy activity.
If we further look into the four most active areas, we
can use the ship type mapping to compare dierences
in ships attacked in dierent regions. Figure 10 imme-
diately highlights the dierence between Indonesia and
26 News about piracy boom, http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/
376-unprecedented-increase-in-somali-pirate-activity
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Fig. 7 Number of attacks reported in the Gulf of Aden 2005{
2011, aggregated quarterly.
the other areas, namely that in the Indonesia region far
more tugs and other small vessels are attacked than in
the other regions. Another dierence that stands out
is that there is such a big dierence in the types of at-Linked Open Piracy: A story about e-Science, Linked Data, and statistics 11
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Indonesia, considering the sudden change in the types of attacks in India. This spill over into the Arabian Sea, which falls in
the LOP piracy region \India Bengal", after september 2009, is shown in Figure 9.
tacked ships between the Gulf of Aden and East Africa.
In both regions big vessels make up the largest por-
tion of the victims, but in East Africa these are mostly
container ships, while in the Gulf of Aden many more
tankers get attacked. In order to explain this, extra in-
formation is needed, for example on the number of ship
movements of these types in these areas. There might
simply be relatively more tankers in the Gulf of Aden
region than before the coast of East Africa. Unfortu-
nately, such data is not openly available.
We can also split out the attacks by types of attack
to see whether pirates take a dierent approach in dif-
ferent regions. Plotting these statistics in a graph, split
out per region, has the advantage that one can quickly
see the dierences, whereas plotting these on a map still
requires interpretation from the user. Here, the region
clustering shows its merit. In Figure 11, one can see that
signicant dierences exist between the regions in the
types of attacks. In Asia, for example, far more often
ships are boarded (which often also means robbed) than
in the African regions. In the Gulf of Aden attacks have
become more aggressive and more often victim ships are
red upon. This also shows from the weapons analysis
in Subsection 5.3. In the Gulf of Aden, also more at-
tempted hijackings occur than elsewhere.
8 Related Work
Maritime piracy is a problem that is as old as maritime
trade. However, in the past decade, the problem has ex-
ploded again starting with a growing number of attacks
o the coast of Somalia since 2005 [1]. With the increase
in attacks, and the incurred costs on trade, also the
interest from the (research) community has grown to
analyse the attacks and devise counter measures such as
from a naval perspective [20], from socio-economics [18],
and agent-based systems [11]. The work at hand, pro-
vides the prerequisites for facilitating analyses from a
variety of perspectives on the piracy attack data.
The past few years, a considerable body of work
has been published on converting governmental data to
Linked Open Data [8]. Essentially, the work at hand
is also an Open Government Data project, similar to
data.gov [15] and data.gov.uk [16], with the exception
that this data is intergovernmental. Furthermore, our
data set was not previously published for access in an
open government portal. The case we present deals with
scraping event descriptions from Web pages.
All the event descriptions are represented as SEM
events. We chose this model because it is a simple but
expressive and exible model. We have for example used
it to represent user ratings of museum pieces [26], his-
torical events [23], and Automatic Identication Sys-
tem (AIS) of NMEA ship data for the recognition of12 Willem Robert van Hage et al.
Fig. 9 Attacks in the Arabian Sea after september 2009 plotted in Google Earth. They types of attacks are very similar to
those in East Africa and the Gulf of Aden (violent attacks, shown in red, yellow and green), but not similar to the types of
attacks previously known in the India and Bay of Bengal region (boardings with the purpose of robbery, shown in blue). An
animated version of this gure can be found online25.
ship behavior from trajectories and background knowl-
edge from the Web [28]. A very similar model is LODE,
which has been used for the extraction of events from
Wikipedia timelines [19]. Both SEM and LODE focus
on the \Who does what, where and when?", but LODE
does not contain a typing system, whereas SEM does.
An example of a much richer event model is part of the
CIDOC-CRM [7]. The purpose of CIDOC-CRM is the
integration of meta data about (museum) artifacts. A
description of an integration method that, as the work
presented in this paper, also combines space, time and
semantics, using CIDOC-CRM can be found in [10].
The SEM specication27 contains mappings to LODE
and CIDOC-CRM.
In section 7.1 we discuss the SPARQL package for
R. An example of the SPARQL package being adopted
for a semantic, statistical, and visual analysis of Linked
Data can be found at the Linked Science website [12].
27 SEM, http://semanticweb.cs.vu.nl/2009/11/sem/
9 Conclusions and Future Work
We have shown that the ideas behind the Open Govern-
ment Data initiative can also be applied to information
sources from intergovernmental organizations without
the need to change their entire information workow.
Automatic conversion of online open data can bring
them to the Web and help these organizations with
their business by making it easier to answer questions
about their data. In this case study, the representation
we use is the Simple Event Model, which helps to in-
tegrate spatio-temporal reasoning with web semantics.
The Simple Event Model has an appropriate level of
abstraction for the integration of piracy event data: it
is more general than the dierences between the data
sources taken into account in this paper (as well as those
used in other cases, cf. [23,26,28]), but it is specic
enough to answer the domain questions presented in
Section 7. In Section 3 we show that the event extrac-
tion process is exible and can be applied to new dataLinked Open Piracy: A story about e-Science, Linked Data, and statistics 13
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Fig. 10 Victim types per region for the Gulf of Aden, East Africa, India Bengal and Indonesia regions with the number of
attacks on bulk carriers in beige, chemical tankers in cyan, container ships in purple, crude oil tankers in red, general cargo
ships in pink, and tugs in brown. Attacks in Indonesia aim to rob any ship, also smaller ships in harbors, like tugs, while
attacks near Somalia aim to hijack big ships, like tankers and container ships. For the sake of brevity the legend only shows
ship types with 5 or more occurrences in the data set.
sets by adapting the XPath query and the exception
rules used for parsing the crawled webpages. The con-
version process can also be applied to other types of
data sets such as low-level GPS information (cf., [28]).
This modularity allows us to combine data sources
with relatively little change in the code base. When the
initial development of the IMB screen scraper was done,
the adaptation to the set of NGA WTS reports could
be done in an afternoon. We have shown that dierent
data sources provide dierent aspects of an event, and
their combination allows for interesting and serendip-
itous data analysis. When the data set was ready to
answer the UNOSAT and IMB domain questions dis-
cussed in Section 7.2 and 7.3, we got the answers to the
additional example domain questions in Section 7.4 for
free. Statistical tests to compare the distribution of ship
types, attack types, per time interval or region are easily
done by importing the RDF data into the R statistical
language with the SPARQL R package. We contributed
to the Linked Open Data by new RDF data sets and
their connection to existing parts of the LOD cloud.
These links participate in weaving the LOD cloud, to
enhance new research dimensions for future research
questions to nd answers.
Whereas most data resources seem unstructured,
there are many report websites that would be very
suited to scraping. For most programmers, putting to-
gether a scraper for a website such as ICC-CCS is a
matter of days. One of the drawbacks of live scraping
is that websites tend to change their formatting, which
happened with the ICC-CCS database three times in
the time frame covered by the scraped event descrip-14 Willem Robert van Hage et al.
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Fig. 11 Number of Attacks per Year Sorted by Attack Type for Gulf of Aden, East Africa, India and Indonesia Regions. The
attack types in the Gulf of Aden and East Africa dier signicantly from the rest of the world (2 test). In 2010 the India
Region (the Arabian Sea) has become more similar to East Africa and Aden.
tions (2005{2012). This can cause code that at rst suc-
ceeded at scraping event descriptions to fail at scrap-
ing the same data, due to a change in presentation.
Scraper code will have to be continuously maintained
to keep working. Caching snapshots of the source web-
site can help with the transition from one version of the
source website to the next. A more more robust solu-
tion to the entire migration to RDF would be to directly
connect to a database using tools like D2RQ [4]. This
way the translation code will not have to be changed
when the HTML rendering of the data changes. How-
ever, database schema changes can still require a change
in the translation code.
Real-world data is dirty. It is estimated that about
5% of data entered manually is incorrect [14]. There
were indeed data entry mistakes in the event descrip-
tions. In total there were 3 distinct incorrect spelling
variants of event type identiers (e.g., `boraded' in-
stead of `boarded') and 2 naming inconsistencies (e.g.,
`redupon' instead of `red upon') amongst 6 unique
corrected event types over 2357 events. The main source
of mistakes was the victim ship type identiers, where
there were 12 incorrect spellings (e.g., `vehicule carrier'
instead of `vehicle carrier') and 20 naming inconsisten-
cies (e.g., `refrigerated cargo' versus `reefer') amonst 54
unique corrected actor types. 5 plus 32 corrections over
2357 entries is about 1.5%, which is a relatively low
rate of mistakes. In all the mistakes could be solved
with 37 correction rules. Over time the number of cor-
rection rules that had to be added dropped very rapidly,
because the growth of the number of new types slowed
down. An illustration of the growth of the vocabulary of
ship types is shown in Figure 12. The growth is signi-
cantly slower than a square root of the number of event
records. Many of these errors could have been easily
prevented if a stricter form had been used for record-Linked Open Piracy: A story about e-Science, Linked Data, and statistics 15
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Fig. 12 Growth of the number of unique victim ship types as
more event descriptions are processed. The solid line shows
the number of victim types and the red dashed line the func-
tion f(x) = 3:46x0:35.
ing the piracy reports. For instance, auto completion in
the data entry user interface could have avoided many
typo's like writing `fried upon' instead of `red upon'.
Event models have recently gained more interest
in the research community, because they can be used
to represent `who', `what', `where', and `when', which
are core concepts in many dierent domains. A sim-
ple representation of events, actors, places, and their
respective types makes it easy to analyze events. For
instances, when events, actors, or places are identied
by a single URI they can be counted easily. Adopting
an RDF graph representation makes it easy to add in
extra descriptive properties of event facets. For exam-
ple, in the case described in this article it was simple to
add a hierarchical classication of the places into EEZs
and regions without any other changes to the data and
with minimal changes (only additions) to the SPARQL
queries used to count the events.
As future work, we aim at doing further natural lan-
guage processing on each report's content description
in plain text in order to extract more information: the
number of pirate boats and pirates, the intervention of
a coalition war ship or helicopter, the outcome of the at-
tack, etc. All these aspects, when present in the report,
are informally stated and their formalization would help
to answer further research questions such as: Is there a
dierence in the level of aggression in the attacks in
the Gulf of Aden? What is the status of most of the
attacked vessels? How many cases of attacks where a
warship intervened had a successful outcome? Also, we
would like to investigate the possibility to interlink the
Linked Open Piracy data set with news items on the
World Wide Web. This would provide additional back-
ground information to the semantic event descriptions,
but also a semantic description of the news articles on
the Web.
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